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Microblogs are increasingly exploited for predicting prices and traded volumes of stocks in nancial markets.
However, it has been demonstrated that much of the content shared in microblogging platforms is created and
publicized by bots and spammers. Yet, the presence (or lack thereof) and the impact of fake stock microblogs
has never systematically been investigated before. Here, we study 9M tweets related to stocks of the 5 main
nancial markets in the US. By comparing tweets with nancial data from Google Finance, we highlight
important characteristics of Twier stock microblogs. More importantly, we uncover a malicious practice –
referred to as cashtag piggybacking – perpetrated by coordinated groups of bots and likely aimed at promoting
low-value stocks by exploiting the popularity of high-value ones. Among the ndings of our study is that as
much as 71% of the authors of suspicious nancial tweets are classied as bots by a state-of-the-art spambot
detection algorithm. Furthermore, 37% of them were suspended by Twier a few months aer our investigation.
Our results call for the adoption of spam and bot detection techniques in all studies and applications that
exploit user-generated content for predicting the stock market.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e exploitation of user-generated content in microblogs for the prediction of real-world phe-
nomena, has recently gained huge momentum [51]. An important application domain is that of
nance, and in particular, stock market prediction. Indeed, a number of works developed algorithms
and tools for extracting valuable information (e.g., sentiment scores) from microblogs and proved
capable of predicting prices and traded volumes of stocks in nancial markets [11]. Notably, nance
is increasingly relying on this information through the development of automatic trading systems.
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All such works ground on the assumption that microblogs collectively represent a reliable proxy
for the opinions of masses of users. Meanwhile however, evidence of fake accounts as well as spam
and automated (bot) activities in social platforms is being reported at a growing rate [17, 26]. e
existence of ctitious, synthetic content appears to be pervasive since it has been witnessed both
in online discussions about important societal topics (e.g., politics, terrorism, immigration), as well
as in discussions about seemingly less relevant topics, such as products on sale on e-commerce
platforms, and mobile applications [19]. For instance, regarding politics, it has been demonstrated
that bots tampered with recent US [8], Italian [18], French [24], Japanese [50], and – to a minor
extent – German [12, 40] political elections, as well as with online discussions about the 2016 UK
Brexit referendum [7].
us, on the one hand, user-generated content in microblogs is being exploited for predicting
trends in the stock market. On the other hand, without a thorough investigation, we run the risk
that much of the content we rely on, is actually fake and possibly purposely created to mislead
algorithms and users alike [46]. Should this risk materialize, real-world consequences would
be severe, as already anticipated by a few noteworthy events [23]. On May 6 2010, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average had the biggest one-day drop in history, later called the Flash Crash.
Aer ve months, an investigation concluded that one of the possible causes was an automated
high-frequency trading system that had incorrectly assessed some information collected from the
Web [33]. In 2013, the US International Press Ocer’s Twier account got hacked and a false
rumor was posted reporting that President Obama got injured during a terrorist aack. e fake
news rapidly caused a stock market collapse that burned $136B1. en, in 2014, the unknown Cynk
Technology briey became a $6B worth company. Automatic trading algorithms detected a fake
social discussion and begun to invest heavily in the company’s shares. By the time analysts noticed
the orchestration, investments had already turned into heavy losses2.
1.1 Contributions
In a recent investigation [21], we reported the rst preliminary evidence of the presence of nancial
spam in stock microblogs, raising serious concerns over the reliability of such information. Here, we
deepen our previous analyses by performing a number of additional experiments on co-occurring
cashtags, on nancial markets, and on suspicious users. Specically, we extend our previous work
with the following novel and unpublished contributions:
• we analyze co-occurring cashtags in nancial tweets by focusing on their industrial and
economic classication. In detail, we show that co-occurrences of stocks in suspicious
tweets are not motivated by the fact that those stocks belong to the same industrial or
economic sectors (§ 5.2);
• since real-world relatedness (as expressed by industrial classication) is not a plausible
explanation for co-occurring stocks, we then turn our aention to market capitalization.
We demonstrate that, in suspicious tweets, high capitalization companies co-occur with
low capitalization ones. Moreover, we show that this large dierence can not be explained
by the intrinsic characteristics of our dataset, but it is rather the consequence of an external
action (§ 5.3);
• we compare the social and nancial importance of investigated companies, highlighting
that stocks of one specic market (OTCMKTS) feature a suspiciously high social importance
1hp://www.telegraph.co.uk/nance/markets/10013768/Bogus-AP-tweet-about-explosion-at-the-White-House-wipes-billions-o-US-markets.
html
2hp://mashable.com/2014/07/10/cynk/#HD9o6llp6gqw
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despite their low nancial importance. is result is in contrast with measurements obtained
for stocks of the other markets – e.g., NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSEARCA, and NYSEMKT (§ 5.4);
• we employ a state-of-the-art spambot detection technique to analyze authors of suspicious
tweets. Results show that 71% of suspicious users are classied as bots. Furthermore, 37%
of them also got suspended by Twier a few months aer our investigation (§ 6).
Summarizing, this study moves in the direction of investigating the presence of spam and bot
activity in stock microblogs, thus paving the way for the development of intelligent nancial-spam
ltering techniques. To reach our goal, we rst collect a rich dataset comprising 9M tweets posted
between May and September 2017, discussing stocks of the 5 main nancial markets in the US.
We enrich our dataset by collecting nancial information from Google Finance about the 30,032
companies mentioned in our tweets. Cross-checking discussion paerns on Twier against ocial
data from Google Finance uncovers anomalies in tweets related to some low-value companies.
Further investigation of this issue reveals a large-scale speculative campaign – which we refer
to as cashtag piggybacking – perpetrated by coordinated groups of bots and aimed at promoting
low-value stocks by exploiting the popularity of high-value ones. Finally, we analyze a small subset
of authors of suspicious tweets with state-of-the-art bot detection techniques, identifying 71%
(18, 509 accounts) of them as bots.
1.2 Cashtag piggybacking
Results of our study uncover a large presence of bot accounts in stock microblogs on Twier.
More specically, we thoroughly document a practice aimed at promoting low-cap stocks (mainly
OTCMKTS stocks) by exploiting the popularity of high-cap ones.
We name this novel kind of spam as cashtag piggybacking, by borrowing the concept of piggyback3
from the eld of computer networks [55]. In many network protocols, a sender node is allowed
to deliver short messages (e.g., ACKs to previous packets) to a receiver node, without sending a
dedicated packet. In fact, the sender can postpone the short message until a new packet must be
sent. At this time, the sender piggybacks (i.e., adds) the message as part of the outgoing packet. In
network protocols, piggybacking allows to increase the eciency in communications [55]. Indeed,
fewer packets are sent, since small amounts of information can be sent “on top of the shoulders” of
other packets.
Within the context of stock microblogs, we show that coordinated groups of bots piggyback
some low-value stocks “on top of the shoulders” of other high-value stocks. Hence, the cashtag
piggybacking name.
1.3 Roadmap
e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant related work in
stock market prediction from social media, and in spam and bot detection. en, Section 3 describes
the dataset used in this study. In Section 4 we briey provide an overview of the characteristics of
our dataset and we describe the methodology adopted to identify suspicious tweets. In Section 5 we
analyze suspicious tweets and nancial markets from several viewpoints. Instead, in Section 6 we
turn our aention to the authors of the suspicious tweets, looking for bots among them. Section 1.2
gives the motivations and denition of the newly identied cashtag piggybacking spam campaign.
Section 7 provides a critical discussion of our results, and nally, Section 8 draws conclusions and
highlights some promising directions for future research and experimentation.
3hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piggybacking (data transmission)
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2 RELATEDWORK
Since no study has previously addressed bot activity in stock microblogs, this section is organized
so as to separately survey previous work either related to the exploitation of user-generated content
for nancial purposes, or to spam and bot characterization.
2.1 Finance and social media
Works in this eld are based on the idea underlying the Hong-Page theorem [32]. Such theorem,
when cast in the nancial domain, states that user-generated messages about a company’s future
prospects provide a rich and diverse source of information, in contrast to what the small number
of traditional nancial analysts can oer.
Starting from the general assumption of the Hong-Page theorem, much eort has been devoted
towards the detection of correlations between metrics extracted from social media posts and stock
market prices. In particular, sentiment metrics have been widely used as a predictor for stock prices
and other economic indicators [10, 15, 27, 30, 47, 54]. e primary role played by the sentiment
of the users as a nancial predictor is also testied by the interest in developing domain-specic
sentiment classiers for the nancial domain [16, 53]. Others have instead proposed to exploit
the overall volume of tweets about a company [45] and the topology of stock networks [49] as
predictors of nancial performance. Specically, authors of [45] envisioned the possibility to
automatically buy or sell stocks based on the presence of a peak in the volume of tweets. However,
subsequent work [65] evaluated the informativeness of sentiment- and volume-derived predictors,
showing that the sentiment of tweets contains signicantly more information for predicting stock
prices than just their volume. e role of inuencers in social media has also been identied as a
strong contributing factor to the formation of market trends [13]. Others have instead used weblogs
for studying the relationships between dierent companies [39]. In detail, co-occurrences of stock
mentions in weblogs have been exploited to create a graph of companies, which was subsequently
clustered. Authors have veried that companies belonging to the same clusters feature strong
correlations in their stock prices. is methodology can be employed for market prediction and as
a portfolio-selection method, which has been shown to outperform traditional strategies based on
company sectors or historical stock prices.
Another line of research focused on the exploitation of social media content for monitoring
and predicting rm equity value. As an example, the study in [63] investigated the eect of social
media and conventional media, their relative importance, and their inter-relatedness on short-term
rm equity value prediction. Findings indicated that social media has a stronger relationship with
rm equity value than conventional media, while social and conventional media have a strong
interaction eect on stock performance. Similarly, in [44] authors focused on the eects of social
media-derived metrics compared with conventional online company behavioral metrics. Results
derived from autoregressive models suggested that social media-derived metrics (e.g., weblogs and
consumer ratings) are signicant leading indicators of rm equity value. Even more interestingly,
conventional online behavioral metrics (Google searches and Web trac) have a signicant yet
substantially weaker predictive relationship with rm equity value than social media metrics.
Another study [43] from the same authors assessed the extent to which “consumer buzz”, in the
form of user-generated reviews, recommendations, and blog posts, inuence rm value. Results
support the dynamic relationships of buzz and Web trac with rm value, and the related mediation
eects of buzz and trac. e study also uncovered signicant market competition eects, including
eects of both a rm’s own and its rivals’ buzz and trac.
Nowadays, results of studies such as those briey surveyed in this section are leveraged for
the development of automatic trading systems that are largely fed with social media-derived
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information [22]. As a consequence, such automatic systems can potentially suer severe problems
caused by large quantities of ctitious posts. As discussed in the next section, the presence of social
bots – and of the fake content they produce – is so widespread as to represent a serious, tangible
threat to these, and other, systems [29].
2.2 Spam and bots in social media
Since our study is aimed at verifying the presence and the impact of spam and bot activity in stock
microblogs, in this section we focus on discussing previous work about the characterization and
detection of spam and bots in social media.
Many developers of spammer accounts make use of bots in order to simultaneously and con-
tinuously post a great deal of spam content. is is one of the reasons why, despite bots being in
rather small numbers when compared to legitimate users, they nonetheless have a profound impact
on content popularity and activity in social media [1, 29]. In addition, bots are driven so as to act
in a coordinated and synchronized way, thus amplifying their eects [48, 64]. Another problem
with bots is that they evolve over time, in order to evade established detection techniques [57, 60].
Hence, newer bots oen feature advanced characteristics that make them way harder to detect with
respect to older ones. Recently, a general-purpose overview of the landscape of automated accounts
was presented in [25]. is work testies the emergence of a new wave of social bots, capable of
mimicking human behavior and interaction paerns in social media beer than ever before. A
subsequent study [19] compared “traditional” and “evolved” bots in Twier, and demonstrated that
the laer are almost completely undetected by platform administrators. Moreover, a crowdsourcing
campaign showed that even tech savvy users are incapable of accurately identifying the evolved
bots.
Since bots and spammers evolved, puing in place complex mechanisms to evade existing
detection systems, scholars and platform administrators tried to keep pace by proposing powerful
techniques based on prole [4, 17, 42], posting [6, 41, 59], and network [2, 28, 35, 61] characteristics
of the accounts. e study presented in [19] however demonstrated that also the majority of these
bot detection techniques, which are based on o-the-shelf machine learning algorithms applied for
analyzing of one account at a time, are unable to eectively detect the evolved bots. In order to
overcome this limitation a recent stream of research proposed ad-hoc detection techniques for the
collective analysis of groups of accounts, rather than single accounts [18, 20, 34, 36, 37, 62]. ese
techniques achieved beer detection results than previous ones [19], and represent nowadays the
last bulwark against pervasive malicious accounts in social media.
However, the bale is far from over. Indeed, given this worrying picture, it is not surprising that
bots have recently proven capable of inuencing the public opinion for many crucial topics [7, 8, 24]
and in many dierent ways, such as by spreading fake news [52] or by articially inating the
popularity of certain posts [9] and public characters [17]. e combination of automatic trading
systems feeding on social media data and the pervasive presence of spam and bots, motivates
our investigation on the presence of spam and bots in stock microblogs. Moreover, the nancial
domain has already been proven to have peculiar characteristics with respect to many information
processing tasks (e.g., ranking [14] and ltering [56] content, expert nding [58], etc.) so as to
require ad-hoc analyses, such as the one carried out in this work.
3 DATASET
Our dataset for this study is composed of: (i) stock microblogs collected from Twier, and (ii)
nancial information collected from Google Finance.
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Fig. 1. Sample tweets with the $AAPL, $WMT, and $AMZN cashtags.
nancial data twitter data
markets companies median cap. ($) total cap. ($B) users tweets retweets (%)
NASDAQ 3,013 365,780,000 10,521 252,587 4,017,158 1,017,138 (25%)
NYSE 2,997 1,810,000,000 28,692 265,618 4,410,201 923,123 (21%)
NYSEARCA 726 245,375,000 2,227 56,101 298,445 157,101 (53%)
NYSEMKT 340 78,705,000 256 22,614 196,545 63,944 (33%)
OTCMKTS 22,956 31,480,000 45,457 64,628 584,169 446,293 (76%)
total 30,032 – 87,152 467,241 7,855,518 1,802,705 (23%)
Table 1. Financial and social dataset composition. Total values of users, tweets, and retweets only count
distinct items and thus do not equal to the sum of previous rows.
3.1 Twier data collection
Twier users follow the convention of tagging stock microblogs with so-called cashtags. e
cashtag of a company is composed of a dollar sign followed by its ticker symbol (e.g., $AAPL is
the cashtag of Apple, Inc.). Figure 1 shows two sample tweets with the $AAPL, $WMT, and $AMZN
cashtags. Similarly to hashtags, cashtags are visually highlighted on Twier’s interface can be
used as an ecient mean to lter content and to collect data about given companies [31]. For this
reason, we based our Twier data collection on an ocial list of cashtags. Specically, we rst
downloaded a list of 6,689 stocks traded on the most important US markets (e.g., NASDAQ, NYSE) from
the ocial NASDAQ Web site4. en, we collected all tweets shared between May and September
2017, containing at least one cashtag from the list. Data collection from Twier has been carried
out by exploiting Twier’s Streaming APIs5. Aer our 5 months data collection, we ended up with
∼9M tweets (of which 22% are retweets), posted by ∼2.5M distinct users, as shown in Table 1.
As a consequence of our data collection strategy, every tweet in our dataset contains at least one
cashtag from the starting list. However, many collected tweets contain more than one cahstag, many
of which are related to companies not included in our starting list. Indeed, overall we collected
data about 30,032 companies traded across 5 dierent markets.
3.2 Financial data collection
We enriched our Twier dataset by collecting nancial information about each of the 30,032
companies found in our tweets. Financial information have been collected from public company
4hp://www.nasdaq.com/screening/company-list.aspx
5hps://developer.twier.com/en/docs/tweets/lter-realtime/overview
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Fig. 2. Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) hierarchical schema.
TRBC levels
ticker company activity industry industrial group business sector economic sector
AAPL Apple, Inc. Computer
Hardware-NEC
Computer Hardware Computers,
Phones & House-
hold Electronics
Technology
Equipment
Technology
GOOG Alphabet, Inc. Search Engines Internet Services Soware & IT
Services
Soware & IT
Services
Technology
JNJ Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutic-NEC Pharmaceutic Pharmaceutic Pharmaceutics &
Medical Research
Healthcare
Table 2. Examples of TRBC classifications.
data hosted on Google Finance6. Among collected nancial information, is the market capitalization
(market cap) of a company and its industrial classication.
e capitalization is the total dollar market value of a company. For a given company i , it is
computed as the share price P(si ) times the number of outstanding shares |si |: Ci = P(si ) × |si |. In
our study, we take the market cap of a company into account, since it allows us to compare the
nancial value of that company with its social media popularity and engagement7. In Table 1 we
report the median capitalization of the companies for each considered market. As shown, important
markets such as NYSE and NASDAQ trade, on average, stocks with higher capitalization than those
traded in minor markets.
Industrial classication is expressed via the omson Reuters Business Classication8 (TRBC). As
shown in Figure 2, TRBC is a 5-level hierarchical sector and industry classication, widely used in the
nancial domain for computing sector-specic indices. At the topmost (coarse-grained) level TRBC
classies companies into 10 economic sectors, while at the lowest (ne-grained) level companies
are divided into 837 dierent activities. A few examples of the TRBC industrial classication are
reported in Table 2. In our study, we compare companies belonging to the same category, across all
5 levels of TRBC.
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(a) Cashtag-cloud of most tweeted companies.
(b) Mean tweet volume per hour. Peak
hours overlap with the opening hours
of the New York Stock Exchange (red
band).
(c) Distribution of the number of cash-
tags per tweet.
Fig. 3. Overall statistics about our dataset.
4 ANALYSIS OF STOCK MICROBLOGS
4.1 Dataset overview
Surprisingly, the vast majority (76%) of companies mentioned in our dataset do not belong to the
NASDAQ list and are traded in OTCMKTS, as shown in Table 1. Having so many OTCMKTS companies in
our dataset is already an interesting nding, considering that our data collection grounded on a list
of high-capitalization (high-cap) companies. OTCMKTS is a US nancial market for over-the-counter
transactions, and thus it has far less stringent requirements than those needed from NASDAQ, NYSE,
NYSEARCA, and NYSEMKT. For this reason, many small companies opt to be traded in OTCMKTS instead
of the more requiring markets. However, in addition to small-cap companies, OTCMKTS also trades
American depositary receipts (ADRs)9, which allow to trade in US markets the stocks of non-US
companies, otherwise only traded in other foreign markets (e.g., stocks of Samsung Electronics
6hps://www.google.com/nance
7In the remainder, share prices and market capitalizations are considered as of July 4, 2017.
8hps://nancial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/data-analytics/market-data/indices/trbc-indices.html
9hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American depositary receipt
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Fig. 4. Examples of stock time series, for 12 highly tweeted stocks. Mean values are marked with cyan solid
lines and thresholds above which peaks are detected (K = 10) are marked with red solid lines.
Co., Ltd. would only be traded in the Korea Exchange). OTCMKTS also trades Convertible Preferred
stocks10, which are a particular kind of stocks that give more guarantees to investors with respect
to common stocks. Other types of assets might be traded in this market. In our study, we do not
discriminate between dierent types of assets traded in OTCMKTS and we rely on the nancial
information contained in Google Finance, irrespectively of the kind of traded stocks.
us, from a company viewpoint, our dataset is dominated by stocks traded in OTCMKTS. However,
OTCMKTS companies play a marginal role from both a nancial and social viewpoint, having low
median capitalization and small numbers of tweets, the vast majority of which are retweets. In
contrast, companies from NASDAQ and NYSE have high capitalization and are mentioned in many
tweets, with low percentage of retweets.
In the following, we report on some of the general characteristics of our dataset. Figure 3a shows
a cashtag-cloud representing the most tweeted companies in our dataset. In gure, cashtags are
color-coded so as to visually highlight companies traded in dierent markets. e most tweeted
companies in our dataset are in line with recent trends (e.g., the $BTC (Bitcoin) and $ETH (Ethereum)
cryptocurrencies) and with ndings of previous works [3, 31] (e.g., $AAPL leading the way, followed
by $AMZN, $FB, and $TSLA). Notably, no company from OTCMKTS appears among top mentioned
companies, but instead they play a rather marginal role. Figure 3b shows the mean volume of
tweets collected per hour. e largest surge of tweets occurs between 10am and 5pm (US Eastern
10hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preferred stock
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time), which almost completely overlaps with the opening hours of the New York Stock Exchange
(9:30am to 4pm). is fact further highlights the strong relation between stock microblogs and the
real-world stock market. Finally, as previously introduced, many stock microblogs contain more
than one cashtag (e.g., the right-hand side tweet in Figure 1). Figure 3c shows the distribution of
distinct cashtags per tweet, with a mean value of 2 cashtags/tweet.
4.2 Stock time series analysis
In order to uncover possible malicious behaviors related to stock microblogs, we carry out a ne-
grained analysis of our data. Specically, we build and analyze the hourly time series of each of the
6,689 stocks downloaded from the NASDAQ Web site. Given a stock i , its time series is dened as
si = (si,1, si,2, . . . , si,N ), with si, j being the number of tweets that mentioned the stock i during the
hour j . Figure 4 shows some examples of our stock time series, for 12 highly tweeted stocks across
3 markets (NASDAQ, NYSE, and NYSEMKT). As shown in gure, stock time series are characterized by
long time spans over which tweet discussion volumes remain rather low, occasionally interspersed
by large discussion spikes. is behavior is consistent with what has been previously observed
in Twier for other phenomena (e.g., communication paerns related to emergency events [5]).
Indeed, the bursty an spiky characteristics of social communications have been recently explained
as a direct consequence of human dynamics [38].
To give a beer characterization of this phenomenon we ran a simple anomaly detection technique
on all the 6,689 time series. As typically done in many time series analysis tasks, our anomaly
detection technique is designed so as to detect a peak pi, j in a time series si i the tweet volume
for the hour j deviates from the mean tweet volume s¯i by a number K of standard deviations:
pi, j ⇐⇒ si, j > s¯i + K × σ (si )
e parameter K determines the number of peaks found by our anomaly detection technique. In
fact, a bigger K implies that a larger deviation from the mean is needed in order to detect a peak.
Figure 5 shows the number of peaks detected in our time series, as a function of the parameter K .
For the remainder of our analysis we set K = 10, which represents a trade-o between the height
of considered peaks and the number of peaks to analyze. is choice of K results in 1,926 peaks
detected in our time series. Time series depicted in Figure 4 also show mean values (cyan solid
line) and the 10σ threshold (red solid line) above which peaks are detected.
Next, we are interested in analyzing the tweets that generated the peaks (henceforth, peak tweets).
In detail, a peak pi, j is composed of a set of tweets ti, j , such that each tweet t ∈ ti, j contains the
cashtag related to the stock i and has been posted during the hour j (i.e., the peak hour):
ti, j = {t1i, j , t2i, j , . . . , tMi, j }, M = si, j
us, for each of the 1,926 peaks pi, j we analyze the corresponding set of tweets ti, j . We nd out
that, on average, 60% of tweets t ∈ t are retweets. In other words, the peaks identied by our
anomaly detection technique are largely composed of retweets. In addition, considering that our
time series have hourly granularity, those retweets also occurred within a rather limited time span,
in a bursty fashion. is nding is particularly interesting also considering that in all our dataset,
we had only 23% retweets, versus 60% measured for peak tweets.
We also analyzed tweets t ∈ t by considering the co-occurrences of stocks. From this analysis
we see that tweets t ∈ t typically contain many more cashtags than tweets t < t. e cashtags
that co-occur in peak tweets seem unrelated, and the authors of those tweets don’t provide further
information to explain such co-occurrences. As an example, Figure 6 shows 4 of such suspicious
tweets. In gure, in every tweet, a few cashtags of high-capitalization (high-cap) stocks co-occur
with many cashtags of low-cap stocks. e distributions of the number of retweets per tweet,
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Fig. 5. Number of peaks detected, as a
function of K .
Fig. 6. Examples of suspicious peak tweets. In every tweet,
a few cashtags of high-cap stocks (green-colored) co-occur
with many cashtags of low-cap stocks (red-colored).
(a) Retweets per tweet. (b) Cashtags per tweet.
Fig. 7. Beanplots showing the dierences in the number of retweets per tweet and in the number of cashtags
per tweet, for all tweets of the dataset (green-colored) and for peak tweets (light blue-colored). Peak tweets
feature a higher number of retweets and a higher number of cashtags per tweet.
and of the number of cashtags per tweet, are shown in gures 7a and 7b respectively. In gure,
the distributions are shown with beanplots and allow to compare values measured for the whole
dataset (green-colored), with those measured only in peak tweets (light blue-colored).
e characteristics of peak tweets previously highlighted – that is, the percentage of retweets
and the number of co-occurring cashtags – dier signicantly from those measured for the whole
dataset. e reason for this peculiar phenomenon could be related to some real-world news or
event, that motivates the surge of retweets and the co-occurrences of dierent cashtags. However,
such dierences could also be the consequence of a shady, malicious activity. Indeed, there have
already been reports of large groups of bots that coordinately and simultaneously alter popularity
and engagement metrics of Twier users and content [9, 26]. In particular, mass retweets have
been identied as one mean to articially increase the popularity of certain content [19].
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Fig. 8. Co-occurrence graph of stocks mentioned in all tweets of our dataset. OTCMKTS stocks (red-colored)
hold a peripheral position in the graph.
5 ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL SPAM
In this section we evaluate dierent hypotheses in order to thoroughly understand the reasons
why so many seemingly-unrelated cashtags co-occur in peak tweets, and the reason for the high
percentage of retweets in peaks.
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5.1 Visualizing co-occurring stocks
We begin by computing and visualizing the graph of co-occurring stocks for our whole dataset,
and by comparing it with the graph of stocks that co-occur only in peak tweets. Our co-occurrence
graphs represent the collective interconnections of stocks based on their paired presence within
tweets. For the sake of clarity, graphs in gures 8 and 9 only show stocks whose degree ≥ 95.
Figure 8 shows the co-occurrence graph of stocks mentioned in all tweets of our dataset. Stocks
are colored according to their market. As shown, the core of the graph is mainly composed of
stocks belonging to NASDAQ (blue-colored) and NYSEARCA (green-colored) markets. In addition to
stocks of the 5 markets already introduced, Figure 8 also shows cashtags related to cryptocurrencies
(yellow-colored). is is because in Twier cryptocurrencies are labeled with cashtags, similarly to
stocks. However, cryptocurrencies are not traded in regulated nancial markets and hence in gure
they are labeled as OTHERS. As shown, cryptocurrencies represent a large cluster of our graph,
with a few highly important nodes such as Bitcoin ($BTC) and Ethereum ($ETH). ite intuitively,
cryptocurrencies are however well separated from the rest of the graph, meaning that they rarely
co-occur in tweets with stocks traded in nancial markets. Finally, in Figure 8 OTCMKTS stocks
(red-colored) cover only a small and peripheral portion of the graph.
In Figure 9 we recreate the co-occurrence graph by only considering peak tweets. is time,
the core of the graph is mainly composed of stocks from NASDAQ (blue-colored) and OTCMKTS (red-
colored). More precisely, OTCMKTS stocks are not in the periphery of the graph, but instead are well
interconnected with NASDAQ stocks. In addition, the degree of many OTCMKTS stocks is comparable
to that of NASDAQ stocks. Intuitively, this means that OTCMKTS stocks appear very frequently in
peak tweets, and that they oen co-occur in such tweets with NASDAQ stocks.
5.2 Analysis of co-occurring stocks by industrial classification
Previous work have investigated the co-occurrences of stocks in weblogs and their relation to
real-world events. In particular, authors of [39] applied a clustering technique over a stock co-
occurrences matrix, identifying a number of clusters containing highly correlated stocks. Results
of this study highlighted that stocks that co-occur in blog articles as a consequence of real-world
events, belong to the same industrial sector. In other words, results of [39] support the assumption
that stocks that legitimately appear related between one another in weblogs (or microblogs), are
also related in real-world. us, as a consequence of common sense and previous studies, it would
be suspicious for some stocks to appear related (i.e., co-occurring) in microblogs, without being
related (i.e., belonging to the same industrial sector) in real-world.
To evaluate whether co-occurring stocks in peak tweets of our dataset are also related in real-
world, we exploited the TRBC classication previously introduced in Section 3.2. Specically, for
each tweet t ∈ t we measured the extent to which the stocks mentioned in t belong to the same
(or to dierent) TRBC class(es), for all the 5 hierarchical levels of TRBC. As a measurement for
the dierence in TRBC classes across stocks in a tweet, we leveraged the notion of entropy. us,
given a tweet t ∈ t containing X distinct cashtags (i.e., each one associated to a dierent company)
and the level j of TRBC with Nj classes, we rst built the list of TRBC classes of the X companies
mentioned in t :
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cX )
en, we computed the normalized Shannon entropy of the TRBC classes in c, for TRBC level j , as:
H cnorm(j) =
−
Nj∑
i=1
pci log2 pci
Hmax(j)
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Fig. 9. Co-occurrence graph of stocks mentioned in peak tweets. OTCMKTS stocks (red-colored) are central to
the graph and are strongly connected with a number of NASDAQ stocks (blue-colored).
where pci is the empirical probability that TRBC class i appears in c, and Hmax(j) is the maximum
theoretical entropy for TRBC level j:
Hmax(j) = − log2
1
X
Because of the normalization term, 0 ≤ H cnorm ≤ 1. us, H cnorm ∼ 0 implies companies of the same
industrial sector, while H cnorm ∼ 1 implies unrelated companies.
Intuitively, considering that the 5 TRBC levels are hierarchical, we expect H cnorm to be higher
(i.e., more heterogeneity) for ne-grained TRBC levels, while we expect H cnorm to be lower (i.e., less
heterogeneity) for the topmost, coarse-grained TRBC level. Results of this experiment, with TRBC
level j ranging from the lowest level 1 to the topmost level 5, are shown in Figure 10a. For every
TRBC level, a boxplot and a scaerplot show the distribution of normalized entropy measured
for each peak tweet. As expected, H cnorm actually lowers when considering coarse-grained TRBC
levels, as shown by the median value of the boxplot distributions. Nonetheless, median H cnorm > 0.5
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(a) Peaks tweets. (b) All dataset.
Fig. 10. Normalized Shannon entropy of the industrial (TRBC) classes of co-occurring stocks in tweets. TRBC
level 1 has the finest grain, while level 5 has the coarsest grain. As shown, median entropy > 0.5 for all 5
TRBC levels, meaning that co-occurring companies in tweets are largely unrelated. Mean entropy values are
reported above the boxplot and scaerplot distributions. Mean entropy measured for peak tweets is always
higher than that measured for all tweets of the dataset. All dierences are statistically significant.
for all 5 TRBC levels, meaning that co-occurring companies in peak tweets are largely unrelated.
Figure 10b shows the result of the same measurement carried out on all tweets of our dataset,
rather than only on peak tweets. Interestingly, the entropy measured in all our dataset is smaller
than that measured for peak tweets, for all 5 TRBC levels. In turn, this means that co-occurring
companies in peak tweets are overall less related than those co-occurring in tweets not belonging
to a peak. Dierences between the entropies measured for peak tweets and for all the dataset
are statistically signicant for all 5 TRBC levels, with all p-values < 0.01 according to a 2-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Notably, even for ne-grained TRBC levels, there is a minority of peak tweets for which we
measured H cnorm = 0. ese tweets might actually contain mentions to companies related also in
real-world.
Summarizing, the results of this experiment seem to suggest that, overall, co-occurrences of
stocks in peak tweets are not motivated by the fact that stocks belong to the same industrial or
economic sectors.
5.3 Analysis of co-occurring stocks by market capitalization
Since real-world relatedness (as expressed by industrial classication) is not a plausible explanation
for co-occurring stocks in our dataset, we now turn our aention to market capitalization. We are
interested in evaluating whether a relation exists between the capitalization of co-occurring stocks.
For instance, legitimate peak tweets could mention multiple stocks with similar capitalization.
Conversely, malicious users could try to exploit the popularity of high-cap stocks by mentioning
them together with low-cap ones.
One way to evaluate the similarity (or dissimilarity) in market capitalization of co-occurring
stocks is by computing statistical measures of spread, standard deviation (std.) being a straightfor-
ward one. us, for each peak tweet t ∈ t we computed the std. of the capitalization of all companies
mentioned in t . Results are shown in Figure 11, where boxplots and scaerplots are depicted as a
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Fig. 11. Standard deviation of the capitalization of co-occurring companies in peak tweets, and comparison
with a bootstrap. The large measured standard deviation implies that high-cap companies co-occur with
low-cap ones.
function of the number of distinct companies mentioned in tweets. en, in order to understand
whether the measured spread in capitalization is due to the intrinsic characteristics of our dataset
(i.e., the underlying statistical distribution of capitalization) or to other factors, we compared mean
values of our empirical measurements with the result of a bootstrap. For bootstrapping the std. of
tweets that mention x companies, we randomly sampled 10, 000 groups of x companies from our
dataset. en, for each of the 10, 000 random groups we computed the std. of the capitalization of
the x companies of the group. Finally, we averaged results over the 10, 000 groups. is procedure
is executed for x = 2, 3, . . . , 22, thus covering the whole extent of Figure 11.
Results in gure highlight a large empirical std. between the capitalization of co-occurring
companies. is means that in our peak tweets, high-cap companies co-occur with low-cap ones.
Moreover, the measured std. is larger than that obtained with the bootstrap. In turn, this means
that the large dierence in capitalization can not be explained by the intrinsic characteristics of
our dataset, but it is rather the consequence of an external action.
e previous experiment already lead to interesting results. However, it does not allow to draw
insights into the possibly dierent characteristics of stocks traded in dierent markets. In order to
evaluate the capitalization of co-occurring stocks, for stocks of dierent markets, we evaluated the
assortativity of the co-occurrence graph of stocks mentioned in peak tweets. e graph used for
this experiment is the one depicted in Figure 9. e assortativity is computed on the capitalization
of the nodes (i.e., companies) of the graph, rather than on their degree as it is typically done with
this kind of analysis.
Specically, for every stock, we compare its capitalization with the weighted mean of the
capitalizations of its neighbors in the graph. e weighting factor is based on the number of
co-occurrences between stocks (i.e., the weight of the edge in the co-occurrence graph). Results are
presented in Figure 12 as scaerplots with a linear t, and are grouped by market. In gure 12 we
only show plots for NASDAQ, NYSE, and OTCMKTS since they represent the most interesting results.
As shown, stocks of NASDAQ and NYSE, the most important markets of our dataset, are assortative
(slopes equal 0.44 and 0.55). In other words, high-cap stocks of NASDAQ and NYSE typically co-occur
with other high-cap stocks. is behavior is consistent with what one would intuitively expect.
Conversely, OTCMKTS stocks are almost non-assortative at all, as demonstrated by slope ∼ 0.
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(a) NASDAQ. (b) NYSE. (c) OTCMKTS.
Fig. 12. Assortativity plots for the co-occurrence graph of stocks mentioned in peak tweets. Assortativity is
computed out of stocks capitalization and results are grouped by market.
It is also important to note that while the assortativity of NASDAQ and NYSE stocks is higher when
considering peak tweets instead of all the tweets of our dataset, for OTCMKTS stocks we measure the
opposite behavior. is means that in peak tweets OTCMKTS stocks co-occur with high-cap stocks
more oen than when considering all our dataset.
5.4 Social and financial importance
So far, we demonstrated that tweets responsible for generating peaks, mention a large number of
unrelated stocks, some of which are high-cap stocks while the others are low-cap ones. Adding
to these ndings, we are also interested in assessing the relation between the social and nancial
importance of our 30,032 stocks. Financial importance of a stock i can be measured by its market
capitalization Ci . Social importance can be quantied as the number of times a stock is mentioned
in stock microblogs. Intuitively, we expect a positive correlation between stock capitalization
and mentions, meaning that high-cap stocks are mentioned more frequently than low-cap stocks.
Notably, this positive relation has already been measured in a number of previous works, such
as [45], and has been leveraged for predicting stock prices.
spearman’s ρ kendall’s τ
markets all dataset peaks all dataset peaks
NASDAQ 0.4074 0.0772 0.2960 0.0526
NYSE 0.6347 0.3497 0.4703 0.2452
NYSEARCA 0.4318 0.1429 0.2966 0.1429
NYSEMKT 0.1054 0.0420 0.0719 0.0215
OTCMKTS 0.0778 −0.2658 0.0556 −0.1758
Table 3. Rank correlation between market capitalization and number of tweets.
By exploiting our data in Table 1 we can make a rst assessment of this relation over the whole
dataset and compare it with that measured for peak tweets. Specically, in Table 3 we report
the values of 2 well-known rank correlation measures – namely, Spearman’s rank correlation
coecient (ρ), and Kendall’s rank correlation coecient (τ ) – between the capitalization of a stock
and the number of tweets mentioning that stock. e rank correlation is computed for all stocks
of the 5 markets. When considering all our dataset, for stocks of all markets, except OTCMKTS, we
nd a positive correlation conrming our previous hypothesis. Instead, stocks of OTCMKTS feature
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Fig. 13. Kernel density estimation of social and financial importance, for stocks of the 5 considered markets.
OTCMKTS stocks have a suspiciously high social importance despite their low financial importance, in contrast
with stocks of all other markets.
negligible rank correlations over all the dataset. Even more interestingly, the signicant correlation
measured over all the dataset for stocks of important markets almost completely disappears when
only considering peak tweets. Furthermore, OTCMKTS stocks in peak tweets even feature a moderate
negative correlation. In other words, results of this experiment imply that the less capitalized stocks
in OTCMKTS are more likely to appear in peak tweets than the more capitalized ones, a behavior
that is both counterintuitive and in contrast with results of previous works. In turn, this further
highlights the presence of suspicious behaviors in peaks.
With the goal of beer evaluating the relationship between social and nancial importance
of stocks appearing in peaks, we also performed an additional experiment as follows. Given a
stock i and a peak p, we counted the number of times that i is mentioned in peak tweets of p.
We repeated this measurement for every peak p, and we computed the median value of these
measurements that represents the social importance of stock i in all peak tweets. en, for every
stock, we ploed its measurement of social importance versus that of nancial importance, and we
visually grouped stocks by their market. To avoid overploing, we performed a bivariate (i.e., 2D)
kernel density estimation, whose results are shown in Figure 13. For the sake of clarity, we split the
social–vs–nancial space into 4 sectors. Sector A (top-right) denes a region of space with stocks
having both a high social and nancial importance. Stocks in Sector B (top-le) are characterized
by high nancial importance, but low social importance. Stocks in Sector C (boom-le) have
both low social and nancial importance, while stocks in Sector D (boom-right) have high social
importance despite low nancial importance.
By comparing stock densities of dierent markets in Figure 13, we see that OTCMKTS stocks almost
completely lay in Sector D. All other markets have their stock densities mainly laying in Sector B and
Sector A. In other words, OTCMKTS stocks have a suspiciously high social importance (i.e., they are
mentioned in many tweets and across many peaks), despite their low nancial importance. Results
for all other markets are more intuitive, with NYSEARCA stocks achieving the best combination of
social and nancial importance. Summarizing, we measured a positive relation between social
and nancial importance when considering all stock microblogs shared during the 5 months of
our study. However, when focusing our analysis on peaks in stock microblogs, we observed a
suspicious behavior related to OTCMKTS stocks.
6 ANALYSIS OF SUSPICIOUS USERS
In previous sections we identied a wide array of suspicious phenomena related to stock microblogs.
In particular, peaks in microblog conversations about high-cap stocks are lled with mentions of low-
cap (mainly OTCMKTS) stocks. Such mentions can not be explained by real-world stock relatedness.
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Fig. 14. Examples of suspicious users classified as bots. The many characteristics shared between all these
users (e.g., name, profile picture, social links) support the hypothesis that they are part of a larger botnet.
Fig. 15. Example tweets from two suspicious users classified as bots.
Moreover, the peaks in microblog conversations are largely caused by mass retweets. Despite not
having been studied before, this scenario resembles those recently discovered when investigating
the activities of bots tampering with social political discussions [19, 26, 48]. Unfortunately, systems
for automatically detecting spam in stock microblogs are yet to be developed. However, recent
scientic eorts lead to the development of several general-purpose bot and spam detection systems.
6.1 Digital DNA for social bot detection
In this section we employ a state-of-the-art bot and spam detection system, specically developed for
spoing malicious group activities, to classify suspicious users [18, 20]. e goal of this experiment
is to assess whether users that shared/retweeted the suspicious peak tweets we previously identied,
are classied as bots. In turn, this would bring denitive evidence of bot activities in the stock
microblogs that we analyzed. e system in [18, 20] performs bot detection in 2 steps. Firstly, it
encodes the online behavior of a user into a string of characters that represents the digital DNA of
the user. en, multiple digital DNA sequences, one for each user of the group under investigation,
are compared between one another by means of string mining and bioinformatics algorithms. e
system classies as bots those users that have suspiciously high similarities among their digital DNA
sequences. Notably, the system in [18, 20] proved capable of accurately detecting also “evolved”
bots (F1 = 0.97), such as those described in [25].
Because of the computationally intensive analyses performed by [18, 20], we constrained this
experiment to the 100 largest peaks (i.e., those generated by the greatest number of tweets) of our
dataset. Starting from those top-100 peaks, we then analyzed the 25, 957 distinct users that shared
or retweeted at least one peak tweet. Behavioral information needed by the detection system to
perform user classication have been collected by crawling the Twier timelines of such 25, 957
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users. Notably, the bot detection system classied as much as 18, 509 (71%) of the analyzed users as
bots. Figure 14 shows 6 examples of users classied as bots, while Figure 15 shows some tweets of
the same users. A manual analysis of a subset of bots allowed to identify characteristics shared
between all the users (e.g., similar name, join date, prole picture, etc.), supporting the hypothesis
that they are part of a larger botnet. Users classied as bots also feature very high retweet rates
(ratio of retweets over all posted tweets), thus explaining the large number of retweets in our peaks
and among OTCMKTS stock microblogs.
We obtained these results by analyzing only the 100 largest detected peaks, therefore analyses of
minor peaks might yield dierent results. Nonetheless, the overwhelming ratio of bots that we
discovered among large peaks discussing popular stocks, raises serious concerns over the reliability
of stock microblogs.
6.2 Twier bot detection
In previous experiment we relied on a state-of-the-art bot detection technique in order to classify
our accounts. Here, following a procedure originally used in [19], we also evaluate whether Twier
itself detected and suspended the suspicious accounts that we identied. In fact, accounts that are
suspected to perform malicious activities or that violate Twier’s terms of service, get suspended
by Twier.
To carry out this experiment we exploited Twier’s responses to API calls and, in particular,
Twier error codes11. Given a query to a specic account, Twier APIs reply with information
regarding the status of the queried account. API queries to a suspended account result in Twier
issuing error code 63. Instead, for accounts that are still active, Twier replies with the full metadata
information of the account, without issuing any error.
Results of this experiment show that, out of the 25, 957 suspicious accounts, as much as 9, 490
(37%) accounts have been suspended by Twier somewhen between November 2017 and May
2018. is result is a clear demonstration that many of the accounts responsible for creating the
peaks in nancial discussions, are actually bots. It is not surprising that the digital DNA-based
technique [18, 20] detected more bots than Twier (18, 509 versus 9, 490). Indeed, it has been
recently demonstrated that state-of-the-art detection techniques are more eective than Twier
at detecting sophisticated bots [19]. Moreover, to avoid closing accounts of legitimate users by
mistake, Twier is typically conservative with its suspension policy. Finally, there is a very large
overlap between the accounts suspended by Twier and those labeled as bots via the digital DNA
technique: 8, 887 out of 9, 490 accounts (∼ 94% of all Twier suspensions).
7 DISCUSSION
Results of our extensive investigation highlighted the presence of spam and bot activity in stock
microblogs. For the rst time, we described an advertising practice that we called cashtag piggyback-
ing, where many nancially unimportant (low-cap) stocks are massively mentioned in microblogs
together with a few nancially important (high-cap) stocks. Analyses of suspicious users suggest
that the advertising practice is carried out by large groups of coordinated social bots. Considering
the already demonstrated relation between social and nancial importance [45], a possible outcome
expected by perpetrators of this advertising practice is the increase in nancial importance of the
low-cap stocks, by exploiting the popularity of high-cap ones.
e potential negative consequences of this new form of nancial spam are manifold. On the one
hand, unaware investors (e.g., noise traders) could be lured into believing that the social importance
of promoted stocks have a basis in reality. On the other hand, also the multitude of automatic
11hps://developer.twier.com/en/docs/basics/response-codes.html
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trading systems that feed on social information, could be tricked into buying low value stocks.
Market collapses such as the Flash Crash, or disastrous investments such as that of Cynk Technology,
could occur again in the future, with dire consequences. For this reason, a favorable research
avenue for the future involves quantifying the impact of social bots and microblog nancial spam
in stock prices uctuations, similarly to what has already been done at the dawn of nancial e-mail
spam.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst exploratory study on the presence of spam and bot
activity in stock microblogs. As such, future works related to the characterization and detection of
nancial spam in microblogs, are much desirable. Indeed, no automatic system for the detection
of nancial spam in microblogs has been developed to date. To overcome this limitation, in our
analyses we employed a general-purpose bot detection system. However, such approach hardly
scales on the massive number of users, both legitimate and automated, involved in nancial
discussions on microblogs. Hence, another promising direction of research involves with the
development of tools and techniques for promptly detecting promoted stocks, thus avoiding the
need for a cumbersome user classication. In addition, a strict characterization of the social bots
involved in cashtag piggybacking spam campaigns (e.g., their behavior and network characteristics),
is also needed.
Finally, we believe it is useful – and worrying at the same time – to demonstrate the presence
of bot activity in stock microblogs. Finance thus adds to the growing list of domains recently
tampered by social bots – joining the political, social, and commercial domains, to name but a few.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by the widespread presence of social bots, we carried out the rst large-scale, systematic
analysis on the presence and impact of spam and bot activity in stock microblogs. By cross-checking
9M stock microblogs from Twier with nancial information from Google Finance, we uncovered a
malicious practice aimed at promoting low-value stocks by exploiting the popularity of high-value
ones. In these so-called cashtag piggybacking spam campaigns, many stocks with low market
capitalization, mainly traded in OTCMKTS, are mentioned in microblogs together with a few high
capitalization stocks traded in NASDAQ and NYSE. We showed that such co-occurring stocks are not
related by economic and industrial sector. Moreover, the large discussion spikes about low-value
stocks are due to mass, synchronized retweets. Finally, an analysis of retweeting users classied
71% of them as bots, and 37% of them were subsequently suspended by Twier.
Given the severe consequences that this new form of nancial spam could have on unaware
investors as well as on automatic trading systems, our results call for the prompt adoption of spam
and bot detection techniques in all applications and systems that exploit stock microblogs.
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Fig. 16. Number of peaks detected, as a function of K for OTCMKTS stocks.
(a) $UPZS (Unique Pizza &
Subs Corp.).
(b) $KNSC (Kenergy
Scientific, Inc.).
(c) $INNV (Innovus
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.).
(d) $NNSR (NanoSensors,
Inc.).
Fig. 17. Examples of stock time series, for 4 OTCMKTS stocks. Mean values are marked with cyan solid lines
and thresholds above which peaks are detected (K = 7) are marked with red solid lines.
9 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
e data collection for this study is based on an ocial list of 6,689 high-cap stocks released by
NASDAQ, as detailed in Section 3. As a consequence, we have complete data (e.g., the full time series)
only for the 6,689 stocks of the list. Conversely, we have data about OTCMKTS stocks only if and
when they co-occur with stocks of the list.
Because of this limitation in our dataset, some of our results regarding OTCMKTS stocks could
be biased. In order to rule out this possibility, we carried out an additional data collection phase.
Specically, we collected all tweets shared between June 21 and July 2 2017 (i.e., 12 days), containing
at least one cashtag of an OTCMKTS stock. is data collection lasted only for 12 days because of the
large number (i.e., 22,956) of cashtags that we had to monitor, each one corresponding to a search
keyword of a Twier Streaming crawler. is new dataset is not biased towards high-cap stocks
and represents a clear and complete picture of Twier discussions about OTCMKTS stocks. Of all
the tweets collected that contain at least one cashtag OTCMKTS, 51% of them contain exactly one
cashtag OTCMKTS.
We analyzed this dataset in the same way as the one obtained from the NASDAQ list. Specically,
we carried out the steps described in Section 4. Figure 16 shows the number of peaks detected
in the dataset about OTCMKTS stocks, as a function of the parameter K – that is, the number of
standard deviations from the mean needed to detect a peak in a stock time series. As shown in
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Fig. 18. Examples of tweets with just one OTCMKTS cashtag.
gure, by adopting the threshold chosen in Section 4 (K = 10) we obtain no peaks at all. is is in
sharp contrast with the result shown in Figure 5, obtained by analyzing the dataset derived from
the NASDAQ list. Indeed, the overall volume of tweets that mention only OTCMKTS stocks is very
low. In other words, this means that almost no tweet at all only mentions OTCMKTS stocks, while
instead OTCMKTS stocks are almost only mentioned together with some other high-cap stock. is
result obtained by analyzing the complete dataset of OTCMKTS stocks further supports our ndings
reported in Section 1.2.
If we lower the threshold needed to detect a peak in a stock time series from K = 10 to K = 7,
we end up with 14 peaks, as shown in the examples of Figure 17. Such peaks are generally way
lower than those measured for stocks of the NASDAQ list, which are shown in Figure 4. e 14 peaks
detected in the OTCMKTS stocks dataset are still largely caused by mass retweets. Interestingly,
Figure 18 shows two examples of such peak tweets. As shown in gure, the tweets contain only
the $UPZS cashtag, related to the Unique Pizza & Subs Corp. company. Despite not showing the
cashtag piggybacking behavior, it is clear that these tweets are still aimed at exploiting some highly
popular topics, in order to publicize the $UPZS stock. Indeed, the le-hand side tweet of Figure 18
ends with the keyword “Rihanna”, while the right-hand side one ends with a link to a video related
to (Donald) Trump and a provocative picture. Considering that there is clearly no relation between
the content of the tweets in Figure 18 and the pop singer Rihanna or the US President Donald
Trump, this is just another way to piggyback a stock on top of a popular discussion topic.
Summarizing, an analysis of the OTCMKTS stocks dataset described in this section shows that
OTCMKTS stocks are almost only tweeted in conjunction with other high-cap stocks. is result
supports our previous ndings. Furthermore, we also uncovered a minority of OTCMKTS stocks
that do not feature the cashtag piggybacking behavior, but rather that piggyback stocks on top of
trending keywords.
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